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With few exceptions, induced innovation theories give little consideration either
to the role of distortions as determinants of the factor biases of innovations, or to
the in£uence of technical progress ^ with or without distortions ^ on the sectoral
structure of production. This analysis identi¢es demand for innovations as a
function of a speci¢c policy setting which both conditions and is conditioned by
the structure of production. In this context, when some sectors contribute more
than others to environmental externalities, private and social optima in the
allocation of research resources may diverge. In some circumstances it may be
optimal to use research budget allocations as second-best substitutes for
Pigouvian taxes.
1. Introduction
In the theory of induced innovation, the allocation of resources to the
development and dissemination of new technologies is directed by relative
factor scarcity, as re£ected in market prices.
1 It is well known, however, that
market prices need not re£ect the social opportunity cost of factors, for a
variety of reasons including missing markets and the existence of prior policy
interventions. Distorted factor prices may generate factor or commodity
biases in the demand for innovations, relative to the set of innovations that
would be demanded at undistorted prices.
In this article I explore the implications of agricultural research directed
at sectors that generate disproportionate levels of environmental damage,
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1`a change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a spur to
invention, and to invention of a particular kind ^ directed to economising the use of a
factor which has become relatively expensive' (Hicks 1964). As a long-run phenomenon
the theory has considerable empirical support (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Binswanger et
al. 1978).and which are also the bene¢ciaries of policy interventions. The primary
focus is on the ways in which such distortions a¡ect the demand for
innovations by altering the sectoral structure of production and thus the
pattern of relative factor returns. As the article points out, some industries
demanding, and winning, research resources might not even exist but for
the presence of policies or externalities; progress in R&D then has the
potential to augment the commodity or factor biases that these distortions
impart.
Several previous studies (for example Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz
1993; Alston and Martin 1995) have examined the interaction of trade
policies and agricultural research, including the possibility that research
directed towards a protected sector may have a negative rate of return
when measured at shadow prices. However, this literature dwells almost
exclusively on single-commodity cases and excludes factor markets (Alston
and Martin's model has several commodities but focuses on the special case
of a price-making exporter). This article extends earlier work in these
directions, as well as incorporating externalities and a mechanism
explaining the demand and supply of innovations in terms of prices and
distortions. If decisions about the allocation of public research resources fail
to make use of appropriate shadow prices, then the commodity and factor
biases of publicly funded research (the supply of innovations, in this article)
could re£ect private rather than social optima and thus lead potentially to
immiserizing growth. The article motivates this theoretical inquiry with a
brief and informal case study from highland Southeast Asian vegetable
economies.
1.1 Agricultural development and land degradation in the uplands
In addition to the usual range of staple grains and subsistence foods,
highland farmers in many parts of Asia take advantage of the special
characteristics o¡ered by elevation to grow not only traditional cool-climate
crops such as co¡ee, tea, and cacao, but ^ increasingly ^ to supply
temperate-climate vegetables such as white potato, carrots, cabbage, and
lettuce for sale to burgeoning urban middle classes (Hefner 1990; TDRI
1994; Lewis 1992; Librero and Rola 1994; Scott 1987).
2 Potato production in
the highlands of some Southeast Asian countries provides an interesting
example, since this rapidly growing industry is characterised by both
environmental externalities and strong policy support.
2Under current technologies potato grows best in regions where night-time temperatures
fall below 188C. In Southeast Asia production usually starts at altitudes well above 500m.
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growth in recent years has exceeded population growth,
3 with most of the
increase apparently coming from area expansion rather than from yield
increases (Librero and Rola 1994; Scott 1987). Although the area planted to
this non-traditional crop is relatively small, its expansion is nevertheless
highly in£uential since it represents a move in the most ecologically fragile
areas from soil-conserving tree crops, pasture and long-fallow systems to
highly intensive vegetable gardening in which frequent tillage and weeding
greatly increase the exposure of soils to the leaching and eroding e¡ects of
monsoon rains. Moreover, pesticide and fertiliser use levels on vegetables are
extraordinarily high. Potato in particular is very intensive in its use of
labour, fertiliser and chemical inputs relative to more traditional upland
crops (Coxhead 1995).
Soils in tropical uplands are typically shallow and fragile in structure,
and are easily eroded once their permanent cover is disturbed or removed.
However, productivity declines may be barely noticeable until the topsoil
has been depleted and the infertile subsoil exposed (Lal 1990; Hoang
1994). The di¤culty of measuring inherent soil quality, often coupled with
inadequate de¢nition or enforcement of property rights near the frontier
of cultivation,
4 means that upland land prices seldom fully capture
variation in soil quality. Similarly, o¡-site damages (£ooding, variability of
water supply, siltation and water pollution) associated with soil erosion
and pesticide runo¡ have major impacts on other upland farms as well as
on the downstream costs of providing irrigation, power generation and
drinking water. However, the costs of this non-point pollution are also not
capitalised into upland land values. Upland vegetable cultivation is thus
widely associated with negative externalities, both on-site and further
downstream.
3Econometric evidence on the demand for potato in tropical countries is scarce. Librero
and Rola (1995, table 2.18) cite ¢ndings from a 1973 Philippine study in which the
expenditure elasticity for potato, estimated at 0.87, is by far the highest of all such
elasticities in a 16-commodity study, this value is 50 per cent greater than for all but one
other vegetable.
4Highland land is rarely held in legal title in Southeast Asia. Most highland areas are
classi¢ed as public property either by virtue of their slope, or because they form part of a
protected forest or watershed area. Thus in Thailand a major impediment to socially optimal
agricultural land use arises because `there is no legal basis supporting sustainable permanent
agriculture in the highlands' (TDRI 1994; emphasis in original). In the Philippines, where
all land above 18 per cent slope is o¤cially inalienable public property, the wholesale
invasion and denudation of mountain areas in the Philippines by vegetable farmers have
been documented by Lewis (1992). Without secure tenure farmers are unlikely to take full
account of on-site land degradation problems associated with cultivation of nutrient-
depleting crops.
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the target of special trade and market policies (table 1). Potato imports to
these countries make up 1 per cent or less of domestic supply in most years,
except in Thailand, where the ¢gure is around 5 per cent. Domestic farm-
gate prices exceed the Singapore c.i.f. price of imports from Europe, China
and Taiwan by margins of 30 per cent or more, and wholesale prices in
major urban markets are higher still.
5 The argument that transport costs
confer `natural' protection on potato appears weak when we observe that in
Malaysia, where potato imports are in e¡ect untaxed, there is no commercial
Table 1 Fresh vegetable and potato trade policies in some Southeast Asian countries
NPR: Fresh vegetables






Indonesia 1990 0^50% 21% (NPR) NPR: 29% Duty-free seed
29% (EPR) EPR: 33% potato imports
Malaysia 1993 0^5% 4.4% None Phytosanitary
licensing; cabbage
import quota





Singapore 1989 0 0 None
Thailand 1989 2.4^94.1% 52.7%* Import ban
c Seed potato import
licensing
Notes:
aSimple average except: *weighted average of applied tari¡s.
bThe 1993 Philippine law directed primarily at upland vegetable farmers and known as the
`Magna Carta for Small Farmers' (RA no. 7607) reiterated the import ban on potato, cabbage
and some other horticultural crops and mandated that `importation of agricultural commodities
that are locally produced in su¤cient quantities will not be allowed, to protect producers from
unfair competition' (Philippine Department of Agriculture 1993, p. 31).
cUnder Thai law, fresh potatoes are listed among restricted imports in the category of `imports
generally not allowed' with the objectives of `protecting local production' and `to enable farmers
to sell their products at reasonable prices' (GATT 1991a, pp. 259^60).
NPR  Nominal rate of protection.
EPR  E¡ective rate of protection.
Sources: GATT 1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1993a, 1993b.
5Singapore maintains free trade in fresh potato and imports large quantities from around
the world (Scott 1987). The Singapore c.i.f. price is therefore a reasonably good indicator
of regional border prices. Scott (1987) observed that in the period 1979^84 farm gate prices
in northern Thailand (that country's main production area) were approximately equal to
the Thai currency equivalent of Singapore retail prices. In the Philippines, one of the few
countries in the region for which time series of potato prices are available, the farm gate
price exceeded the Singapore c.i.f. price by an average of 28 per cent between 1961 and 1985
(¢gure 1). However wholesale prices in Manila, the major market, exceed farm gate prices
by 50^100 per cent or more.
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Sources:
Philippine prices calculated from Crissman (1989), Appendix A;

























































































































7cultivation in spite of the presence of a thriving vegetable industry in areas
like the Cameron Highlands.
6
Under current technologies it is di¤cult to imagine Southeast Asian
potato producers competing successfully with imports under free trade ^ that
is, at shadow prices before environmental costs are taken into account. The
import restrictions shown in table 1 appear to be necessary conditions for
the existence of this industry. In spite of this, its continued expansion enjoys
strong policy support. The Philippine Department of Agriculture, for
example, has designated potato, together with more traditional Philippine
agricultural exports such as mango and banana, as a `high-valued crop'
targeted for special policy attention under the `Key commercial crops
development program' (Philippine Department of Agriculture 1995).
7
Highland vegetable producers in turn have formed highly focused and
sometimes powerful lobby groups to defend their status and to press for
public resources in providing infrastructure, marketing support and research
and extension services.
Governments, aid agencies, international organisations and some private
corporations are engaged in technology transfer and adaptive research
directed at improving potato varietal selection, seed stocks, production
techniques and pest management. O¡ the farm, governments and bilateral
aid projects have invested in infrastructural development, marketing support,
price stabilisation, input subsidies and related activities (Crissman 1989;
TDRI 1994).
8 It is di¤cult to quantify the allocation of research resources to
a speci¢c crop, however, the limited data available from the Philippines
6The FAO Production Yearbook does not report potato production data for Malaysia;
however, the FAO Trade Yearbook does report imports. Studies of the Malaysian vegetable
economy make no mention of potato cultivation (Dagap 1987; Bin Othman 1990) and
vegetable specialists working in Malaysia observe no potato production (David Midmore,
personal communications).
7In Thailand, a range of foreign-funded projects and the government's Royal Project have
been instrumental in channelling funds and resources to highland agricultural development.
These projects have introduced new temperate climate fruit, £ower and vegetable crops to
highland areas, encouraging their adoption by subsidising adaptive research, input costs and
marketing (TDRI 1994). The Thai Department of Commerce, which sets trade policy, has
manipulated the quantitative restriction on seed potato imports with the aim of defending
domestic potato prices, restricting imports in years of high domestic production and relaxing
them in bad years (Scott 1987).
8Upland farmers are typically among the poorest groups in any developing country, and
a case can be made on distributional and anti-poverty grounds for discriminating in their
favour. However, this is not generally true for commercial vegetable farmers. According to
Crissman (1989, p. 9): `Potato production in the Philippines is a highly pro¢table activity:
potato producers in Benguet [the major growing area] are among the wealthier small farmers
in the country.'
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in agricultural R&D is approximately equal to their share of the total value
of agricultural production at market prices, while the R&D share of more
land-intensive plantation crops (co¡ee, cacao, rubber) that compete for
upland land and labour resources is only about one-¢fth of their share in the
value of production (¢gure 2). The volume of research output on a
commodity provides another indicator of its share of R&D resources.
Librero and Rola (1994) reviewed 182 research papers produced in the
Philippines between 1970 and 1993 that studied production, marketing and
consumption of vegetables. Of these, 38 (20 per cent) addressed white potato
in whole or in part ^ a fraction far exceeding the importance of this crop
among all vegetables produced in the country. Similar ratios were reported
for other highland vegetables, such as cabbage, also covered by import bans
or restrictions.
In summary, many economic and environmental signals point to Southeast
Asia's potato industry as one in which private returns substantially exceed
social pro¢tability. In this article I examine mechanisms by which such an
industry might become established and grow, and ask how policy-makers
should respond in the allocation of agricultural research resources. I focus
on both trade policies and unaccounted environmental costs as the sources
of di¡erences between market and shadow prices. These distortions are
shown to be capable not only of altering the structure of upland production
^ for example, making it pro¢table to begin cultivation of some crop ^ but
also of spawning demands for R&D investments that may themselves
reinforce the distorted structure.
In the next section I present a simple model examining the e¡ects of
distortions and technical progress on the structure of production. In the
subsequent sections I speculate on the likely welfare and environmental
outcomes when a distorted industry structure generates biases in the demand
for new technologies. A necessary condition for these to compound the
e¡ects of the original distortions is that the supply of innovations be
responsive to distorted rather than shadow prices. The article concludes with
some observations on this point and a discussion of implications for a
medium-run theory of induced innovation.
2. Prices, production and land degradation
How do commodity price interventions, factor endowment changes and
technical progress alter the structure of production in a price-taking
economy? How do such changes a¡ect the endogenous depletion of a
resource such as land quality? In this section I explore these questions and
evaluate their welfare implications. I use a static, two-factor, two-good
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# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997Figure 2 Commodity shares in agricultural R&D expenditures and the value of agricultural production, Philippines
































































































7partial equilibrium framework to highlight the role of equilibrium conditions
and to examine the role of price policy interventions and technical progress
as factors conditioning the rate of land degradation. In this section technical
progress is assumed to occur exogenously; in a subsequent section I relax this
restriction in order to examine the market for R&D and the innovation
inducement mechanism.
Consider an upland agricultural economy in which two goods, X and Z,
can potentially be produced using ¢xed endowments of land (K) and labour
L . Prices px and pz are set in an external market and these in turn
determine wages w and returns to land r.
9 We are particularly interested
in the structure of production and how it is in£uenced by product prices,
factor endowments, and technical progress. Figure 3 presents the basic
Figure 3 Endowments, technology and the structure of production
9The return to labour should be interpreted as a return not only to the `raw' input (for
which the long-run price could seldom be argued to be endogenous to an agricultural region,
even with positive transactions costs) but rather to labour plus management inputs. In the
upland setting, farms typically consist of many small plots worked mainly by family labour;
their managerial input is substantial.
Induced innovation and land degradation 313
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997model.
10 Revenues in each sector are exhausted in factor payments, so for
each good there is a family of isopro¢t curves Qjpj, showing the factor price
combinations consistent with zero pure pro¢ts for given technology and
output price:
Qj  pjyj ÿ wL j  rKj  0; j  X;Z; 1
where yz  Z and yx  X. The shape of an isopro¢t curve indicates the value
of the elasticity of factor substitution in the technology used to produce that
good, and the absolute value of the slope of each curve shows the land^
labour ratio consistent with zero pure pro¢ts at that point. As drawn,
production consists of a land-intensive good X and a labour-intensive good
Z.
A ray from the origin through point A, at the intersection of Qz and
Qx, shows the market-clearing factor price ratio, w=r. Lines tangent to
each isopro¢t curve at this point have slopes equal to the negative of the
equilibrium sectoral labour^land ratios kx and kz. Both goods will be
produced in equilibrium only if the economy's aggregate land^labour ratio
is of intermediate slope. An example of such a ratio is given in the
diagram by the line with slope k, where kx > k > kz. If k lies outside this
range the economy will specialise in production of either X or Z. The
condition that kx > k > kz is equivalent to the requirement that the
endowment point lie within the `cone of diversi¢cation' ^ the region in
which at least as many goods are produced as factors used in their
production (Woodland 1982).
In this model, the representative producer's goal is to minimise costs over
the domain in which pro¢ts are non-negative. This domain is de¢ned by the
area above both isopro¢t curves, so given an initial endowment ratio k, the
equilibrium is at A. This equilibrium is altered by changes in endowments,
commodity prices or technology.
An increase in the endowment of labour relative to land is shown in ¢gure
4 as a shift in the aggregate land^labour ratio from HE to H
0E
0. The
endowment change reduces k, but as long as it is su¤ciently small that
kz < k < kx continues to hold, the factor market equilibrium remains at A
and factor prices are unchanged. Instead, labour endowment growth causes
a change in the sectoral structure of production. This can be seen in ¢gure 4
by de¢ning employment shares llj  L j=L for j  X;Z and noting that along
10This exposition uses the dual of the usual isoquant diagram in order to highlight
changes in the structure of production. For earlier presentations of this dual model see Dixit
and Norman 1980; Woodland 1982 and Mussa 1979. Production technology is assumed to
be non-joint and to exhibit constant returns to scale.
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11 The decline in k thus
reduces llx and increases llz; since factor ratios in each sector are unchanged
at constant factor prices, output of Z must rise and that of X fall (the
Rybczinski e¡ect). Specialization in Z (or X) will occur in an initially
diversi¢ed economy only if the change in the k is large enough that k  kz
(or k  kx).
Commodity price rises displace the isopro¢t curves outwards from the
origin. Figure 5 shows this for a rise in pz, which shifts the isopro¢t curve for
that sector to Q
0
z; this results in a new factor market equilibrium at B. The
Figure 4 E¡ects of a rise in the labour^land endowment ratio
11Land is fully employed in production, so
Kx  Kz  K; from which
llxkx  llzkz  k;
but
llz  1 ÿ llx;rearranging terms:
llx  kz ÿ k=kz ÿ kx  HI=GI; and llz  k ÿ kx=kz ÿ kx  GH=GI:
Figure 4 shows a decline in the land^labour ratio, so k
0 < k: then l
0
lx > llx and l
0
lz < llz. Since
the labour stock is ¢xed and factor prices are unchanged, the output of Z must have risen
and that of X declined at the new land^labour ratio (adapted from Mussa 1979).
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for ¢gure 4 from changes in factor employment shares. Both sectors become
more land-intensive, but the shares of sector Z in employment of both
capital and labour rise while those of sector X fall. The sector whose price
has risen has thus expanded, and the other contracted ^ the Stolper^
Samuelson result. The price change also leads to a new factor market
equilibrium, in which the price of the factor used relatively intensively by the
expanding sector increases relative to that of the other factor; thus at B,
w=r
0 > w=r.
Technical progress in either sector allows producers to pay more for
factors and still make zero pure pro¢ts; therefore, it too can be represented
as an upward displacement of the relevant isopro¢t curve (in the special case
of factor-neutral technical progress, the displacement is homothetic and thus
identical to that caused by a price change and shown in ¢gure 5). For given
commodity prices, output of the sector experiencing technical progress
increases and that of the lagging sector declines.
It follows from the relationships shown in ¢gure 5 that price and
technology policies play potentially important roles in determining the
structure of production. Price policy or R&D resources may be deployed in
Figure 5 E¡ects of a rise in Pz relative to Px
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output mix. In fact ^ and this is a point generally obscured by the factor
market focus of the induced innovation literature ^ price or technology
changes, by shifting the cone of diversi¢cation, can induce an economy that
was specialised in a single sector to diversify, or conversely, induce specialisa-
tion in a formerly diversi¢ed economy.
2.1 Structure of production and land degradation
In upland areas of developing countries, agricultural land degradation rates
depend critically on land use. Some crops and technologies cause much more
rapid rates of soil nutrient depletion and erosion than others (Lal 1990).
Therefore, when land is reallocated among upland agricultural sectors, the
rate of change of average land quality and of the amount of erosion
produced is likely to be altered. We can incorporate the e¡ects of land use on
land quality in this model by measuring factor quantities in e¡ective rather
than in physical units. Thus a change in land quality is the same as a change
in the e¡ective land endowment, and the geometric analysis of such a change
is exactly as shown in ¢gure 4 for an equivalent change in physical
endowments. Small changes in the e¡ective endowment are not re£ected in
factor prices; instead, the structure of upland production shifts in the
direction of the sector making more intensive use of the factor whose
e¡ective endowment has grown by more. The di¡erence between the two
cases lies in the welfare interpretation when the e¡ective endowment change
is not given its full value ^ as will be discussed below.
In the next subsection we formally link the structure of upland production
to the rate of land degradation. Before doing so it is helpful to identify
conditions under which price or technology changes have di¡erent implica-
tions for the value of output, economic welfare and policy. Relative sector
size and factor intensity are clearly important, but in addition we need to
know which activity is more land-degrading on a per-hectare basis, since the
more land-intensive technology need not be more land-degrading (and in fact
is rarely so).
If a sector is relatively land-intensive (as with X in the ¢gures), and if
technology in that sector is also more land-degrading, some or all of the
expansion of its output (whether due to technical progress or a favourable
price shift) will be cancelled by the endogenous reduction in the e¡ective land
endowment as average land quality declines. The endowment shift will have
the opposite e¡ect of causing the X sector to contract. Alternatively, if the
land-intensive sector is relatively less land-degrading, then its expansion due
to a price or technology shift will be reinforced by the rise in the e¡ective
land^labour ratio as resources are drawn out from the more land-degrading
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labour-intensive but is more land-degrading on a per-hectare basis, its
relative pro¢tability will be reinforced by the e¡ective land endowment
decline that its expansion brings about.
Analytically, the third case is clearly the most interesting since it embodies
the greatest potential for welfare losses. Empirically, this is also the most
commonly observed case in the uplands of developing countries. Grain and
vegetable crop production technologies in such regions are typically far more
intensive in their use of non-land inputs than are perennial crops; moreover,
seasonal crops are associated with higher levels of land degradation and soil
erosion than are perennials. The third case also holds the greatest policy
interest since developing country trade, price and research policy di¡erences
between perennials (mainly exportables) and grain or vegetable crops
(typically importables) are often very great, as indicated earlier.
Consider the e¡ects of a tari¡ or equivalent price support conferred on Z
when that sector is both labour-intensive and land-degrading relative to X.
The tari¡ causes Z to expand and X to contract, as in ¢gure 5. The fraction
of total land used in Z increases and, in addition, both sectors become more
land-intensive. Both components of the shift cause the average rate of land
degradation to increase, giving rise to an e¡ective endowment change like
the one shown in ¢gure 4, favouring increased production of the less land-
intensive crop.
However, for a small change in the e¡ective land endowment there will
be no change in factor prices, as ¢gure 4 showed: in other words, the e¡ects
of land degradation will not be capitalised into land prices. In this case,
therefore, both the price intervention and unaccounted environmental
damage promote increased production in the land-degrading sector.
2.2 Welfare implications of distortions and externalities
If increased land use in sector Z causes a decline in the e¡ective land
endowment, then the decline should be captured in a measure of the welfare
implications of policies supporting that sector's expansion, even if market
prices do not change. In this section we construct such a measure, assessing
the e¡ects of a tari¡ change on real expenditures by analysing the aggregate
budget constraint (sometimes called a trade expenditure function). In an
economy with one initial distortion ^ a tari¡ on good Z ^ and an externality
in the form of a missing market for land quality, the aggregate budget
constraint may be written as:
ep;u  gp;v;t  tzezp;u ÿ gzp;v;t ÿ saxKx;azKz; 2
where ep;u is the expenditure function of the representative consumer in
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p;v;t is the economy's aggregate revenue
function in p, factor endowments v  K;L , and technology t  tx;tz. By
Shephard's lemma the partial derivatives of e and g with respect to pz,
denoted by ez and gz respectively, are functions describing domestic demand





foreign (border) price; and s is a damage function in sectoral unit
damages aj 0 and land use Kj.
12 Privately optimal sectoral factor demands
are obtained by cost minimisation as Kj  @c
jw;yj=@r, evaluated at
rp;v  @gp;v=@K, wp;v  @gp;v=@L , and yjp;v for j  X;Z.
Combining these provides an expanded description of the damage function
in terms of prices, tari¡s, endowments, technical progress and sector-speci¢c






What are the welfare implications of an increase in protection for producers
in sector Z? We can answer this question by taking the total derivative of
(2) with respect to pz, using (3), noting that dpz  dp

z  dtz and setting
dp

z  0. After some manipulation we have:
gdu=dtz  tzezz ÿ gzz  @s=@tz; 4
where g  1 ÿ tzezp

z > 0, and ezz < 0;gzz > 0 are the second partial
derivatives of e and g with respect to pz. The `pure' trade policy result
@s=@tz  0 is well known: an increase in the rate of the tari¡ reduces
welfare, exclusive of environmental e¡ects, by inducing overproduction and
underconsumption of Z relative to free trade prices (e.g. Vousden 1990).
Evaluating the change in s is less straightforward. Taking the derivative



















The total change in the damage function has one component re£ecting
changes in the structure of factor demand at constant factor prices, and two
12Land degradation occurs over long periods and its rate can be in£uenced by input and
technology decisions. As such it is customary to model land quality as a state variable in a
dynamic optimisation problem (for a survey see Miranowski and Cochrane 1993). In such
problems other in£uences not included in equation (2) are important: initial soil depth and
quality; regeneration rates and returns to soil-conserving investments; discount rates,
expectations and risk (McConnell 1983; Clarke 1992). Use of a static model is appropriate
either when discount rates are very high, or when secure property rights are absent. As
documented in an earlier section and in footnote 4, property rights in upland agriculture are
often poorly de¢ned or enforced and even when markets for upland land exist, soil erosion
losses may not be capitalised into land values due to the problem of measuring land
quality.
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by noting that c
j


















rww=r@r=@pz ÿ @w=@pzj  X;Z:
6
The ¢rst term on the right-hand side of (6) con¢rms that when the price of
one good rises in terms of the other, the output of that sector expands and
that of the other sector contracts (cross-price derivatives are always negative
in the two-sector model). The second term reminds us that the price change
also raises the relative price of the factor used intensively in the expanding
sector. When Z is labour-intensive this term is positive; the factor price
change causes both sectors to become more intensive in the use of the
relatively less expensive factor. Referring to ¢gure 5, a rise in pz causes the
labour-intensive sector to expand ^ drawing in more land and labour from
sector X ^ but also raises the factor price ratio from w=r to w=r
0. At the
new equilibrium, both sectors display higher land^labour ratios than at A.
Equation (6) shows that for a given commodity price change, the change
in the damage function depends on each sector's propensity for land
degradation aj as well as on its relative factor intensity and the
substitutability of land for labour as re£ected in the cross-price derivatives
c
j
rw. In the case of a higher tari¡ for a relatively labour-intensive sector with
high land degradation potential, we see that @s=@tz > 0, since @r=@pz < 0,
@w=@pz > 0 and az > ax. The expansion of the relatively land-degrading
sector increases its land use at constant factor prices, but also raises w=r,
causing producers in the expanding sector to substitute further towards
land ^ and thus further increasing the extent of new land degradation.
13
Substituting (6) into (4), we conclude that an increase in protection for the
labour-intensive, land-degrading sector will reduce aggregate welfare since
the consequent increase in land degradation will augment the increased
deadweight losses associated with the trade policy change.
In spite of the aggregate welfare loss, however, the tari¡ increase will yield
private bene¢ts to upland producers so long as any increase in on-site land
degradation is not so great as to induce specialisation and thus itself to be a
13If Z were land-intensive, a rise in its price would raise r and reduce w, so the signed term
in (6) enclosed in square brackets would be negative: factor substitution e¡ects would
diminish the additional land degradation caused by the expansion of sector Z.
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14 The increase in protection thus bene¢ts
upland producers at the expense of the rest of the economy ^ including those
sectors directly a¡ected by consequent increases in o¡-site damages.
Finally in this section we consider the e¡ects of technical progress. For
simplicity we restrict our attention to the case of Hicks-neutral (product-
augmenting) change.
15 In this form, technical change has the same e¡ect on
producers as a price rise, and indeed can be analysed by examining changes
in `e¡ective' producer prices pt, where t is an augmentation parameter with
an initial value of unity. Again starting from the equilibrium condition for a
tari¡-distorted economy, we consider the e¡ects of technical progress in the
Z sector. The initial equilibrium is given by:
ep;u  gpt;v  tzezp;u ÿ gzpt;v ÿ saxKx;azKz: 7
Taking the total di¡erential of this with respect to tz gives:
16
gdu=dtz  pzyz ÿ tzyz  pz@yz=@pz ÿ @s=@tz: 8
On the right-hand side of (8), the ¢rst term is the output enhancement e¡ect,
and the second the reduction in tari¡ revenues attributable to the increase
in Z sector output. The sum of these two terms is positive for all plausible
tari¡ rates.
17 The third term, equivalent to that developed earlier, is the e¡ect
of technical progress on the production of the externality:
14As ¢gure 4 shows, a small change in factor endowments alters the structure of
production but not factor rewards. In these circumstances the tari¡ increase raises total
upland factor income, as can be seen by summing equation (1) over X and Z at shadow
prices p
















) tzZ  wp ÿ wp
L  rp ÿ rp
K > 0:
15The analysis is readily extended to non-neutral cases including factor-biased technical
progress (Dixit and Norman 1980). Geometrically, a labour (land) saving bias in technical
progress would rotate an isopro¢t curve clockwise (anticlockwise) in addition to shifting it
out from the origin.
16The derivation uses two relations that hold for product-augmenting technical progress:
ti@g=@ti  pi@g=@pi;and
ti@
2g=@ti@pj  dij@g=@pi  pi@
2g=@pi@pj;
where dij is the Kronecker delta, i.e. dij  1 for i  j, and 0 otherwise (Dixit and Norman
1980, p. 138).
17In Alston and Martin (1995) the possibility of immiserizing growth from technical
progress depends on the magnitude of the change in this sum relative to that of the technical
progress shock.
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where djz  1 for j  Z and 0 otherwise. The ¢rst summation on the right-
hand side of (9) is positive. The second is negative when Z is relatively
labour-intensive, so subtracting it has a positive e¡ect on @s=@tz.
Combining (9) and (8) we see that the overall welfare e¡ect of technical
progress in the labour-intensive, land-degrading sector is indeterminate.
Productivity measured in terms of physical inputs is higher, but the
expansion of this sector is likely to lead to increased production of
environmental damage and in addition, some tari¡ revenues are lost as
domestic output growth replaces imports. As in the case of a tari¡ increase,
however, upland producers bene¢t from the technical progress since they do
not su¡er directly as the result of either reduced tari¡ revenues or a small
increase in land degradation. All things being equal, we would expect that in
this situation private producers will press for the development of new
technologies in protected sectors even though the contribution of such
innovations to increases in aggregate economic welfare is by no means
assured.
3. Technical progress and the demand for innovations
In the theory of induced innovation, the demand for technical progress of a
particular rate and factor-saving bias is explained in terms of shifts in factor
prices or resource endowments (Hicks 1964; Ahmad 1966; Hayami and
Ruttan 1985). The supply of innovations is characterised as being produced
by advances in science and technology that shift out both the frontier of
scienti¢c knowledge and the `metaproduction function' ^ the latter de¢ned
by Binswanger et al. (1978, p. 5) as `the set of techniques that have actually
been developed in the most advanced countries and that are used by the most
advanced ¢rms'. Both the demand and supply shifts are thus driven by
inherently long-run phenomena. However, the theory also recognises a
shorter-run innovation supply response in which changing factor
endowments or prices guide the pace and direction less of basic science than
of technology transfer, screening and adaptive research. These are the
primary activities of most developing-country national agricultural research
institutes (Binswanger and Evenson 1978; Evenson and Pray 1991).
What the theory lacks, however, is a comprehensive explanation of the
demand for innovations over the same intermediate time frame: long enough
for demand to be articulated and a supply response engendered, yet not so
long that the in£uence of factor endowment trends swamps all other
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18 In less than the very long run, product price inter-
ventions and externalities could well dominate factor endowment trends in
shaping the demand and even the supply of technology transfer and adaptive
research. In this section we explore the mechanisms and implications of such
a process.
In induced innovation theory, innovations are sought when factor price
changes re£ecting endowment shifts render some existing technologies
unpro¢table, at given output prices. In the dual formulation, factor prices
within the cone of diversi¢cation are determined by product prices, and the
search by producers for new technologies is directed at maximising factor
returns for given output prices. This ¢ts with the characterisation of both
land and labour as ¢xed assets in uplands: at given product prices,
innovations increase scarcity rents.
To analyse the demand for innovations we introduce a factor price
possibility frontier (FPPF), which by de¢nition is the dual to the meta-
production function in factor quantity space. For given commodity prices,
this frontier represents the outer boundary of possible factor price vectors
achievable at zero pro¢ts with a ¢xed research budget. The shape and slope
of the frontier depend on the initial technologies (Qx and Qz in ¢gures
3^5), the state of scienti¢c knowledge, and the costs of transferring
technologies to the home country or region.
19 The FPPF, or sections of it,
can thus be shifted out not only by the generation of new technologies and/
or reductions in the costs of their acquisition, but also by commodity price
increases.
Suppose for heuristic purposes that initial innovation possibilities are
neutral with respect to crops and technologies, so an equal increase in private
pro¢tability could be obtained for either crop from a given investment of
research resources, R. (In this special case the shape and slope of the FPPF
are determined by existing isocost frontiers, and the costs of adaptive
research merely determine the radial distance between these frontiers and the
FPPF.) In ¢gure 6 the FPPF corresponding to this assumption is drawn in
as F0p;t;R, the lower envelope passing through point C. Unlike the more
general shape of the envelope typically used to represent a metaproduction
function, the peaked shape of the FPPF is a reminder that much applied and
adaptive research is commodity-speci¢c rather than directly oriented to the
18De Janvry (1978) pointed the way for this analysis in an important article in which
structural factor market distortions associated with a bimodal farm size distribution were
identi¢ed as sources of socially suboptimal biases in the demand for new technologies in
Argentine agriculture.
19Binswanger and Evenson (1978, chapter 6) provide a detailed disaggregation of the
costs of adaptive research.
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However, the FPPF also re£ects the lower cost of acquiring and adapting
new technologies that use factors in similar proportions to existing
technologies, since the shortest path (least cost) to the frontier from any
point like A is along a ray of constant factor prices. By construction, if the
entire research budget were to be devoted to factor-neutral improvements in
production technology for each sector, the economy could move along a
ray through the origin from its initial equilibrium to the corresponding point
along F0. A shift from A to C in ¢gure 6 is one example. Research of value
R producing technologies with di¡erent factor proportions relative to A ^ an
expansion along a ray other than w=r ^ could only buy a point closer to the
origin than the frontier F0.
Now suppose as before that expansion of the Z sector causes a land use
shift that reduces land quality and increases environmental externalities.
Technical progress in Z thus causes an increase in the production of
externalities. Upland producers' incomes are una¡ected by small changes in
these externalities; however, aggregate welfare, which includes the costs of
pollution and/or resource depletion, is a declining function of Kz. Thus to a
Figure 6 Factor price possibility frontiers with and without a tari¡
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than from the point of view of the owners of upland land and labour. How
will R be allocated at market prices, and how might it be allocated by a
mechanism that took distortions into account?
Since the owners of upland factors assign no value to tari¡ revenues or
externalities, it is clear that if innovation possibilities are neutral, the optimal
choice of new technology subject to a research budget constraint R will be
that which moves them as far as possible along a ray from the origin. In
terms of ¢gure 6, they will always choose to move to C from A.
The social planner must take account of distortions that drive wedges
between market and shadow prices. Since in this simple model all goods are
traded and their undistorted prices exogenous, the social planner's
optimisation problem is to choose the vector t that maximises the value of
production at shadow (border) prices, net of the e¡ective factor endowment












pjgjtp;v ÿ tzgztp;v ÿ saxKx;azkz  yR ÿ tx ÿ tz
( )
; 10
where j  X;Z and y is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the research
budget constraint. Without loss of generality let p

x  1. The ¢rst-order
conditions of this maximisation are:
@gx=@tx  pz@gz=@tx ÿ tz@gz=@tx ÿ @s=@tx ÿ y  0 11:1
@gx=@tz  pz@gz=@tz ÿ tz@gz=@tz ÿ @s=@tz ÿ y  0 11:2
R ÿ tx ÿ tz  0 11:3
Combining (11.1) and (11.2):
@gx=@tx ÿ @gx=@tz  pz ÿ tz@gz=@tx ÿ @gz=@tz  @s=@tx ÿ @s=@tz:
Using (9) and the relations provided in footnote 8, multiplying by tz and
rearranging:
tz=txyx@yx=@px ÿ pzyz  pz@yz=@pz
ÿ pz1 ÿ tz=tx1 ÿ tz=pz@yx=@pz  tz=tx@s=@tx ÿ @s=@tz;
from which the optimal share of sector Z in the public sector R&D budget
can be solved as:
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pz ÿ tzyz  pz@yz=@pz  pz@yx=@pz ÿ @s=@tz
yx  @yx=@px  pz1 ÿ tz=pz@yx=@pz ÿ @s=@tx
12
where each @s=@tj depends on a and price changes as in (9).
If there are no land degradation e¡ects (e.g. if all aj  0) and no initial
tari¡ distortions tz  0, then the socially optimal share of R&D
expenditures on sector Z depends only on relative supply responsiveness and
the e¡ects of one sector's expansion on the output of the other ^ e¡ects
captured by the ¢rst two terms of the numerator and denominator of (12).
Owners of upland factors will demand a research budget in which tz=R ÿ tz
matches this ratio, and this will also be the socially optimal research
portfolio.
By contrast, if some aj > 0 then the optimal ratio is reduced by the extent
to which, other things equal, a transfer of resources from X to Z or an
expansion of Z would lead to a more rapid rate of degradation ^ just as in
the discussion of price policies and technical progress in the previous section.
In the example we have been using thus far, expansion of Z reduces the
e¡ective land endowment. In ¢gure 6, as technical progress shifts the
economy closer to F0 along w=r, the slope of the aggregate factor endowment
ratio k declines in proportion to the expansion of Z. Accordingly, the social
planner will prefer a di¡erent portfolio of research projects to that
demanded ^ perhaps even one specialised in sector X technologies, but in
any case having a lower allocation of resources to tz than that demanded by
upland farmers. Thus the social planner would prefer to fund research that
moves the upland economy along a ray from A of lower slope than w=r,
re£ecting the higher social opportunity cost of land measured in e¡ective
units, in the direction of a point such as D, below C and also by necessity
below F0, since to acquire new technologies having di¡erent factor
proportions is more costly.
Now consider the in£uence of the tari¡ on the demand for commodity-
speci¢c research resource allocation. Suppose that producers of Z have
acquired additional trade policy protection, such that their isopro¢t curve is
initially Q
0
x rather than Qz and the initial equilibrium is at B, where (relative
to A) a greater share of land is used in the land-degrading sector and
production is more land-intensive in both sectors. The tari¡ also moves the
relevant section of the FPPF out by the same proportion by which Qz was
displaced; the new FPPF is labelled F1p  t;t;R. Upland producers will
now demand a research portfolio directed to achieving the maximum factor
price vector at E. However, from (12), the social planner's optimum will
again lie below the privately optimal point, and in fact will diverge even
further from the private optimum than in the no-tari¡ case. Therefore, the
trade policy will have generated a commodity bias in the demand for
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quality, with a correspondingly greater (negative) welfare impact. If the SP's
only policy instrument is the choice of t, overproduction in Z might be o¡set
by a compensating bias in the allocation of research resources to sector
X.
20
Before turning to a brief discussion of the policy implications of this result,
we should make note of some quali¢cations related to some simplifying
assumptions. First, non-neutral technical progress opportunities would
change the above analysis in predictable ways. Inherent commodity (or
factor) biases in research would be re£ected in the shape of the FPPF. These
would then either augment or o¡set other in£uences on the sectoral structure
of production. Second, it should be noted that a su¤ciently large bias in
R&D resource allocation against Z may result in the upland economy
specialising in the production of X. This simply mirrors the point made
earlier, that price policy or commodity bias in research resource allocation
could induce diversi¢cation in a previously specialised economy. If
production of Z was not privately optimal before the tari¡, then it is
conceivable that welfare maximisation would result in denying the sector
research resources to the point where production of Z ceases once again.
3.1 Innovation biases and constraints to optimal R&D allocations
The idea that research resources should be allocated in ways that compensate
for distortionary policies or for environmental externalities may seem
counter-intuitive at ¢rst, but in certain contexts it may be a useful and even
powerful tool of agricultural development policy. In developing countries,
the kinds of distortions dealt with in this article ^ commodity-speci¢c trade
policies and environmental externalities ^ are frequently very di¤cult to
address directly. Trade policies on upland crops are particularly problematic
from a political economy viewpoint. Upland communities are typically
very poor and may comprise ethnically distinct groups, so for distributional
and political reasons governments may be reluctant to take steps that will
hurt them economically without delivering tangible bene¢ts elsewhere.
20A more subtle problem arises when the nature of the policy intervention is such as to
isolate domestic prices from their world market equivalents. Temperate-climate vegetables
in particular are highly income-elastic foodstu¡s, and since the area suitable for their
cultivation in tropical countries is limited to highlands, urbanisation and per capita income
growth have driven up their domestic prices while the prices of competing crops, linked to
the world market, have in many cases stagnated. The outcome is that the vegetable crops
have come to be regarded as promising sources of future income ^ `high-valued crops'
deserving of public R&D support, while traditional highland agricultural products
languish.
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are consumed largely by relatively wealthy urbanites, so there is unlikely to
be strong consumer demand for reduced protection.
On the environmental side, the inherent di¤culty of using ¢rst-best
measures to correct non-point pollution problems is compounded in uplands
of developing countries by remoteness, poorly developed infrastructure and
a low degree of participation by farmers in formal sector institutions such as
the tax system.
In this setting, second-best solutions to the problems of resource
misallocation and environmental degradation must be sought. In choosing t
by a shadow pricing rule rather than some market-based mechanism the
social planner is using research resource allocation as a substitute for a
Pigouvian tax on Z ^ or an equivalent subsidy on X.
If a shadow pricing rule is the appropriate criterion for R&D allocations,
why do we observe divergences from this rule, as might be argued to be the
case for potato? At the beginning of this article I suggested that part of the
problem of inappropriate research resource allocation, where it occurs, could
stem from a form of `institutional failure'. Di¡erent agencies of government
are charged with di¡erent tasks and these may con£ict. The Ministry of
Agriculture for example, may use farm pro¢tability ^ at market prices ^ as a
criterion for R&D resource allocation, whereas an environmental protection
agency or power generation authority might take a broader view of
agricultural development priorities.
In Southeast Asia there is considerable evidence of institutional failure of
the kind that could inhibit e¡ective policy formation for sustainable
development of highland agriculture. In Thailand, for example, TDRI (1994)
has documented the fragmentation of responsibilities among di¡erent (and
often competing) government organisations:
At present, agricultural research and extension work in the highlands are
conducted on a piecemeal basis. Soil and water conservation research and
technology are the responsibility of the Department of Land Development
(DLD). Separate institutes of the Department of Agriculture carry out
research on horticultural crops (fruits, £owers, vegetables) and ¢eld crops
(rice, wheat, maize, soybean). Extending soil and water conservation
technology and crop improvement methods to farmers are conducted
independently . . . The present bureaucratic division within the Ministry of
Agriculture does not lend itself to the solving of complex problems. (TDRI
1994, p. 133)
In this institutional setting specialised agencies focused on particular
commodity groups are more likely to compete for a larger share of the
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allocation. Moreover, specialised agencies are more vulnerable to `capture'
by well-organised producer groups seeking greater research budgets for their
own commodities. Use of a commonly agreed set of shadow prices for
project evaluation, including research planning, would be an important step
in the direction of improved coordination of policy and programs across
di¡erent agencies involved in agricultural development and natural resource
management.
4. Conclusion
The factor market focus of most induced innovation theory, and its use of
aggregate measures of output, have obscured some important relationships
in diversi¢ed and distorted agricultural economies. First, small changes in
relative factor endowments need not be re£ected in factor price changes as
long as the aggregate factor endowment vector remains within the economy's
cone of diversi¢cation. Thus, small endowment changes may not send the
signal that provides the main mechanism of induced innovation in the
standard theory.
Second, in practice, much or even most agricultural R&D spending is
directed at commodities, rather than at reducing the use of relatively
expensive factors per se. Commodity biases in trade or price policy may alter
the structure of agricultural production, and in so doing generate their own
biases in the private demand for additional innovations.
Third, if the e¡ective factor endowment is altered by agricultural growth ^
as when some crops deplete soils ^ or if agricultural growth generates
externalities, then the market prices of factors will again provide misleading
signals of relative factor scarcity. Agricultural R&D allocations based on
these prices may redistribute income, but will not maximise social returns to
scarce research resources.
In industrialised countries, the e¤ciency cost of biased demand for
innovations is likely to be small, even as a fraction of agricultural income.
In developing economies, where agriculture is much larger in terms both of
factor allocation and of consumption expenditures, and where the total pool
of resources for agricultural research is relatively small, the costs of
misallocation could be large. In so far as the costs of soil erosion from
upland areas of developing countries have been quanti¢ed, they appear to
be surprisingly large in relation to national income (Barbier and Bishop
1995).
Empirically, the potato industry in the highlands of Southeast Asia is one
for which the rate of return to research valued at shadow prices is likely to
be far below that at market prices, and may well be negative once
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virtue of import barriers and ancillary policies, including public and foreign
aid expenditures on research, technology transfer, extension and marketing
support. Under current technologies potato must be grown in high-altitude
areas where soils are fragile, shallow and often steeply sloping; unresolved
pest and disease problems are addressed by very intensive application of
agricultural chemicals, with attendant water, air and soil pollution risks; and
with poorly de¢ned property rights, there is little prospect that upland
farmers will internalise the full environmental costs of cultivation.
More research, both economic and agronomic, is required before there is
a complete basis for research policy recommendations. The optimal rate of
land degradation is never zero, so in some cases social returns to the
production of high-valued crops in highlands may be positive even in spite of
soil erosion and land degradation. On the agronomic front, little is known
about the long-term environmental implications of intensive vegetable
cultivation in tropical highlands. Applied research directed at ¢nding more
environmentally benign ways to produce such crops may well bear fruit.
Failing this, however, and given the likelihood of institutional failure as
described above, the risk is that high private pro¢tability made possible by
trade restrictions, market supports and externalities will successfully
stimulate increased demand for productivity-enhancing research enabling the
expansion of potato area without compensating reductions in the land-
degrading properties of potato cultivation.
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